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Consumer Guarantees in Australia: 
Putting an End to the Blame Game 
 
 
STEPHEN CORONES* 
 
 
 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The focus of this article is on the proposed consumer guarantees component of the Australian 
Consumer Law. The Productivity Commission (PC), in its review of Australia’s Consumer 
Policy Framework, noted that it had not ‘undertaken the detailed analysis necessary to reach a 
judgment on the adequacy or otherwise of the existing regulation in this area, or the merits of 
alternative models such as those adopted in countries such as New Zealand’.1 Accordingly, it 
recommended that: ‘The adequacy of existing legislation related to implied warranties and 
conditions should be examined as part of the development of the new national generic 
consumer law’.2 
 
On 12 March 2009, the Australian government announced that a review of the Australian law 
of implied terms would be undertaken by the Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory 
Council (CCAAC).3 On 26 July 2009, the Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer 
Affairs, the Hon Dr Craig Emerson MP released an Issues Paper on behalf of CCAAC. The 
Issues Paper examined the adequacy of the existing laws on implied terms and the need, if 
any, for amendments.4 A parallel consultation process was conducted with the states and 
territory consumer agencies.  
 
Based on the 33 written submissions received by CCAAC in response to the Issues Paper, 
there were interviews in Canberra and Melbourne with interested parties and additional 
                                                            
* Professor of Law, Queensland University of Technology. The author was the leader of a sub-group within 
CCAAC responsible for preparing the CCAAC Report, Consumer Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied 
Conditions and Warranties. The views expressed represent those of the author, and do not necessarily 
represent those of other members of CCAAC.  
1  Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Final Report (2008) 
recommendation 8.1. 
2  Ibid 176. 
3  The function of CCAAC is to ‘consider reports and papers referred to CCAAC by the Minister and report to 
the Minister on their likely consumer impacts; identify emerging issues impacting on consumers and draw 
those to the attention of the Minister; and investigate and report to the Minister on consumer issues referred 
to CCAAC by the Minister.’ See the CCAAC website at: 
<http://www.directory.gov.au/osearch.php?ou%3DCommonwealth%20Consumer%20Affairs%20Advisory
%20Council%2Cou%3DOther%20Portfolio%20Bodies%5C%2C%20Committees%5C%2C%20Boards%2
0and%20Councils%2Co%3DTreasury%2Co%3DPortfolios%2Co%3DCommonwealth%20of%20Australia
%2Cc%3DAU&changebase > at 28 February 2010. 
4 The reports are available on the Australian Government, the Treasury’s website, CCAAC Review of 
Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties (2009) 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=059&ContentID=1586> at 20 February 2010.  
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teleconferences in September 2009. CCAAC also had discussions with the New Zealand 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs, ASIC and the ACCC on the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
existing implied terms regime. On 30 October 2009, CCAAC presented its report, Consumer 
Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties to Minister Emerson.5  
 
While CCAAC was conducting its review, the National Education and Information Advisory 
Taskforce (NEIAT)6 commissioned Latitude Research, together with On Track Research, to 
conduct a baseline study to generate robust data from consumers and traders in relation to 
statutory warranties and refunds in three markets, whitegoods, electronic goods and mobile 
phones, (the target goods).7 The baseline research was conducted during July and August 
2009. 
 
On 4 December 2009, the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs (MCCA) met in Perth.8 
In relation to consumer guarantees: 
 
Ministers noted the comprehensive studies of the law on consumer rights and the effectiveness 
of existing laws undertaken by the Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council 
(CCAAC) in its Report Consumer rights: Reforming statutory implied conditions and 
warranties and the SCOCA’s National Education and Information Taskforce (NEIAT) in its 
Baseline Study for Statutory Warranties and Refunds. Ministers thanked CCAAC and NEIAT 
for their impressive contributions to the understanding of these laws and the needs of 
consumers and businesses, and further noted the publication of these reports.  
 
Ministers noted the findings of the NEIAT study to the effect that many consumers and 
businesses have little, if any, awareness of consumer rights and that a significant contributor to 
this is the current legal framework.  
 
Informed by the NEIAT study, CCAAC has recommended that the existing system of statutory 
implied conditions and warranties in consumer contracts be replaced with a system of statutory 
consumer guarantees. Ministers share CCAAC’s view that such a system will be a significant 
enhancement of the law and will be more readily understood by consumers and businesses.  
 
MCCA agreed, as part of the development of the Australian Consumer Law, to improve the 
legal framework for consumer rights that apply to the acquisition of goods and services. This 
will be a single national law guaranteeing consumer rights in relation to their acquisition of 
goods and services. They will be based on existing implied conditions and warranties, which 
will be simplified and streamlined. 
                                                            
5 The reports are available on the Australian Government, the Treasury’s website, Consumer Rights – 
CCAAC Report on Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties (2009) 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=035&ContentID=1682> at 20 February 2010. 
6  NEIAT was established in 2007 by the Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs (SCOCA), 
composed of the senior officers of consumer policy and enforcement bodies in Australia and New Zealand, 
to help identify, develop and implement strategies to empower consumers to make informed and timely 
market place decisions. NEIAT’s strategic agenda is available at: Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 
Strategic Agenda (2008) Consumer.gov.au Official Site of the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 
<http://www.consumer.gov.au/html/download/Strategic%20Agenda%202008.pdf> at 20 February 2010.  
7  NEIAT, National Baseline Study for Statutory Warranties and Refunds, Research Paper No 2 October 2009 
(NEIAT Baseline Study) available at: 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1666/PDF/National_Baseline_Study_Warranties_and_Refunds.pdf
> at 20 February 2010.  
8  MCCA comprises Commonwealth, State, Territory and New Zealand Ministers responsible for fair trading, 
consumer protection laws, trade measurement and credit laws. More information can be obtained form its 
official site at: Consumer.gov.au Official Site of the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs 
<http://www.consumer.gov.au/> at 20 February 2010.  
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This new system of consumer guarantees, supported by effective redress, will foster a greater 
ability to inform and educate all Australian consumers and businesses about their rights and 
obligations, and will reduce the compliance burden for businesses, particularly those that 
operate in more than one state or territory.9  
 
This article falls broadly into four parts. The first part will summarise key findings of the 
NEIAT survey. One of the principal findings of the NEIAT study was that the current law 
allows retailers and manufacturers to play the ‘blame game’. The ‘blame game’ refers to a 
situation where the consumer bears the onus of proving which firm in the supply chain 
(retailer or manufacturer) was responsible for the fault, and unless the consumer can do so 
neither party accepts responsibility. 
 
The second part will focus on CCAAC’s recommendations to reform the law, and put an end 
to the ‘blame game’. CCAAC’s principal recommendation was to replace implied terms with 
consumer guarantees which the consumer can enforce against the retailer or the 
manufacturer, without having to prove which of them was responsible for the fault.  
 
The third part examines what the new consumer guarantees will mean for consumers and 
traders in Australia by reference to defects in the quality of electricity supplied, where it is 
unclear whether the outage or fluctuation was the responsibility of the retailer or the lines 
distributor. CCAAC considered that the statutory consumer guarantees ‘should apply to all 
products and services supplied to domestic consumers, including electricity, gas and 
telecommunications’.10 The decision of Miller J of the New Zealand High Court in Contact 
Energy Ltd v Jones11 provides some guidance as to how the law might apply in Australia. 
 
The fourth part will examine how the proposed consumer guarantees regime will fit with the 
existing consumer protection provisions in the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) in 
relation to the supply of faulty goods and services using the supply of electricity as an 
example. Finally, the article considers the Small Compensation Claims Regime of the second 
exposure draft of the National Energy Customer Framework. It appears that the consumer 
guarantees regime may not apply to the supply of electricity as CCAAC recommended. Thus, 
while the marketing rules for electricity will align with the Australian Consumer Law, the 
Government proposes to establish a separate compensation regime for damages suffered by 
residential customers from fluctuations in electricity supply. 
 
II NEIAT BASELINE STUDY: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
 
Until the NEIAT study, very little research had been undertaken in Australia to quantify the 
extent of the consumer detriment flowing from faulty consumer goods and services. 
 
The NEIAT study found that 93% of all Australians aged 16 and over were recent buyers of 
the target goods, and that 51% (8.5 million people) had experienced problems with the target 
goods within the two year period preceding the survey.  
 
                                                            
9 The MCCA Joint Communique (2009) is available at: 
<http://www.consumer.gov.au/html/download/MCCA_Meetings/Meeting_22_4_Dec_09.pdf> at 20 
February 2010.  
10  CCAAC, Consumer Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties, above n 5, 122. 
11  [2009] 2 NZLR 830. 
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In the case of electronic goods and mobile phones the goods in question were less than two 
years old; in the case of white goods, they were less than 5 years old. Most of the faults 
occurred within three to four months of purchase. The average consumer faced 2.5 problems 
during the two year period with a total of 18 million problems with the target goods over the 
two year period. 
 
The NEIAT study estimated that the direct out-of-pocket cost of replacement items, repairs, 
and follow-up costs to be $1.9 billion over the two year period.12 
 
In addition to the direct costs, it was estimated that consumers spent on average 5.7 hours 
attempting to resolve each problem with the target goods, or 100 million hours over two 
years. The total indirect cost to consumers was a further $2.4 billion over the two year 
period.13 The total consumer detriment was estimated to be more than $4.3 billion in relation 
to the target goods over the two year period.14 
 
The NEIAT Baseline Study found that most consumers encountered problems soon after 
buying the product and that 70% of products were still under manufacturer’s warranty when 
the problem occurred and may also have been covered by statutory warranties.15  
 
While 25% of problems were resolved immediately by replacement, repair or refund. The 
Study found: 
 
almost one in five consumers said they were ‘fobbed off’ – told to contact the manufacturer or 
end/drop off the product to them, or simply told that there was nothing wrong and they (the 
consumer) should sort it out themselves. This was more likely to happen with higher valued 
products, and particularly large electrical goods.16  
 
Only 3% of consumers who did not obtain redress contacted fair trading or consumer affairs 
agencies.17 
 
The NEIAT Baseline Study concluded that there are four principal barriers to consumers 
exercising their statutory rights under pt V div 2 of the TPA. They are: 
 
• lack of awareness of the law on the part of consumers, retailers and manufacturers was 
found to be the primary barrier for both consumers and traders, when consumers sought 
to exercise their rights; 
• lack of clarity as to the meaning and scope of the existing law; 
• lack of cost effective dispute resolution mechanisms for consumers; and 
• lack of incentives for suppliers to comply. 
 
The primary reason for the existing laws being ineffective was lack of awareness. 
Consumers, retailers and manufacturers only had a limited understanding of their rights and 
obligations under existing law. The NEIAT study found that 57% of retailers and 47% of 
manufacturers/importers were unaware that consumers are entitled to remedies for breaches 
                                                            
12  NEIAT, above n 7, 20. 
13  Ibid 21. 
14  Ibid 22. 
15  Ibid 39. 
16  Ibid 42. 
17  Ibid 45. 
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of statutory implied terms.18 It also found that consumer awareness of statutory warranties 
was very low, with 80% of consumers being unaware that they had any statutory rights 
implied into their sale contract with the retailer. Most believed they only had rights if the 
manufacturer provided an express warranty.19 
 
This lack of awareness of existing implied rights may be driving the demand for extended 
warranties. Extended warranties are separate contracts entered into at the same time or soon 
after the purchase of a product under which the warranty provider agrees for a term, to repair 
or replace the product in the event of a failure or defect occurring during the warranty period. 
The NEIAT survey found that 38 % of consumers had purchased extended warranties at some 
stage of their life, generally for white goods and large electrical items which consumers 
intended to keep for longer periods because extended warranties offered consumers ‘peace of 
mind’.20 
 
Lack of awareness of rights was only part of the problem. A second barrier identified by the 
NEIAT survey was ambiguity and lack of clarity: as to the nature and content of consumers’ 
rights and traders’ obligations.21 As the NEIAT study noted under the heading ‘ambiguous 
law’:‘[t]he law cannot empower consumers if there are grey areas’.22 
 
Under the current conceptual framework, consumers’ rights are based on terms that are 
implied into the contract between the trader and the consumer. The current regime is a 
regulatory maze with 15 different Commonwealth, State and Territory statutes that establish 
generic statutory implied terms regimes. This creates a compliance nightmare for businesses 
that trade across more than one jurisdiction.  
 
There are two tiers of implied terms, conditions and warranties, with different remedies 
attaching to their breach. Breach of condition entitles the consumer to a right of termination 
and a right to damages, whereas a breach of warranty only entitles the consumer to a right to 
damages. In order to be entitled to return the goods, a consumer must rescind the contract 
under s 75A of the TPA. This requires proof that the supplier has breached a condition rather 
than a warranty. 
 
There are no statutory remedies for breach of the implied terms. In order to obtain a remedy a 
consumer must commence a civil action for damages for breach of contract. 
 
For example, under the Commonwealth regime pt V div 2 of the TPA: implied terms include 
a condition that goods sold must be of merchantable quality. The term ‘merchantable quality’ 
is general and vague.23 The goods must be durable for a period of time that is reasonable in 
light of the circumstances of the sale. The elusive question is: for how long must the goods 
remain durable? 
 
                                                            
18  Ibid 52. 
19  Ibid 50. 
20  Ibid 47. 
21  Ibid 68; table 3, 69. 
22  Ibid table 3, 69. 
23  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 66(2), TPA merchantable quality is defined to mean: ‘As fit for the 
purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly bought as is reasonable to expect having 
regard to any description applied to them; the price (if relevant); and all other relevant circumstances’. 
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As regards the question of ‘durability’, products are referred to as ‘dead on arrival’ (DOA) if 
they have a major fault at the time of purchase, or a major failure soon after purchase. The 
NEIAT study found that traders took a restrictive view of DOA. Most retailers considered 
that it extended to no more than two weeks after purchase.24  
 
Consumer expectations regarding their rights to have goods repaired at no cost to them 
varied, with 54% nominating 6-12 months or 1-2 years. However, 18 % saw the entitlement 
as extending for up to a month, and 12%, only 1-2 weeks to get free repairs.25 
 
About 40% of retailers viewed 12 months as the limit for their responsibility to provide 
repairs; however, 18% of retailers considered that they had no responsibility at all and that 
manufacturers were primarily liable.26 
 
A third barrier to consumers exercising their statutory rights identified in the NEIAT study 
was the lack of effective dispute resolution mechanisms for consumers. Consumers perceived 
the exercise of their statutory rights as involving a ‘lengthy process that is unlikely to result in 
a positive outcome’.27 
 
The current remedies available for breach of implied terms are an action for damages for 
breach of contract, or for termination under s 75A for breach of condition. Civil litigation is 
expensive. The limited dollar value of most consumer claims means that consumers are 
unlikely to seek redress through the courts.  
 
A fourth barrier to consumers exercising their statutory rights was the lack of incentives to 
comply. Currently, the only incentive for a recalcitrant supplier to comply is the threat of 
civil actions by individuals. There is no scope for action by regulators on behalf of 
consumers. Recalcitrant suppliers are aware that consumers are unlikely to litigate in the 
event of a dispute; so they have little incentive to comply. The result is that ‘retailers and 
manufacturers play the “blame game” with neither party prepared to take responsibility’.28  
 
III CCAAC FINDINGS IN RELATION TO THE REFORM OF THE LAW 
 
CCAAC’s starting point was that consumers’ reasonable expectations should be met, and that 
they should be entitled to get what they pay for. It examined ways to reduce this detriment, 
principally by reducing the barriers indentified in the NEIAT Study that prevent consumers 
having recourse to retailers and manufacturers for faulty goods and services.  
 
CCAAC’s findings fall into three broad categories: 
 
• the need to clarify the law ; 
• the need to raise awareness amongst consumers, retailers and manufacturers; and 
• the need to provide more effective dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
 
 
                                                            
24  NEIAT, above n 7, 59. 
25  Ibid chart 39, 60. 
26  Ibid 61. 
27  Ibid table 3, 69. 
28  Ibid.  
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IV CONSUMER GUARANTEES 
 
In order to clarify the law CCAAC recommended replacing the current implied terms regime 
with a new statutory scheme that stands independently of the law of contract. It 
recommended that the Australian consumer law should include a single set of statutory 
consumer guarantees along the lines of those contained in the Consumer Guarantees Act 
1993 (NZ) (CGA). The CGA resulted from a Report prepared by Professor David Vernon at 
the request of the Minister for Justice, the Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer. The Vernon Report 
recommended that the interference with the functioning of the free market should be minimal 
and only to the extent to provide consumer protection. 29 
 
The rationale for eliminating privity and imposing liability on both the manufacturer and the 
retailer of goods was explained by Professor Vernon in terms of a ‘single enterprise theory’, 
according to which consumer sales are made possible by the cooperative efforts of everyone 
in the distribution chain and accordingly they should be jointly responsible: 
 
Some retailers may object to shouldering the responsibility for defects. They may perceive their 
role simply as a conduit of a product manufactured and packaged by others in the distribution 
chain. Since these retailers play no role in creating the product, they may view themselves as 
blameless when the goods or services turn out to be badly designed or produced. In a very real 
sense, they are blameless unless they had reason to know of the defect prior to sale. Accepting 
as fact the retailers’ claim that they neither created the defect nor had any way of knowing prior 
to sale that it existed does not lead to the conclusion that they should be exempted from 
responsibility to consumers for the defect. It leads only to the conclusion that they should be 
reimbursed for their outlay by others in the distribution chain or that it is merely another cost of 
doing business. 
 
The retailer, who sells the goods or services in an effort to make a profit, should not be 
permitted to retain the profit while rejecting responsibility for the very thing that produced it. 
Indeed, no entity in the chain should be permitted to shelter itself from its obligation to the 
ultimate consumer by pointing a finger at someone else in the chain. It is beyond argument that 
all in the chain are engaged in a single enterprise. Since the enterprise functionally is a separate 
unit, the fault of one is functionally the fault of all.30 
 
The consumer guarantees will apply to all jurisdictions imposing strict liability on both 
retailers and manufacturers for goods, in the sense that they may be breached without 
negligence. The absence of a contract will not be a barrier to recovery by the consumer 
against the manufacturer; the statutory causes of action will exist independently of contract. 
The existing two tiers of conditions and warranties will also be abolished.  
 
CCAAC recommended that the manufacturer and retailer should assume joint responsibility 
for the quality of the goods they release into the market place. Consumers should not be 
forced to identify the cause of the fault and prove which firm in the supply chain was 
responsible for it. Imposing strict liability on both the manufacturer and the retailer will 
obviate the ‘blame game’ identified by the NEIAT study as a cause of consumer detriment. 
 
                                                            
29  D Vernon, An Outline for Post-Sale Consumer Legislation in New Zealand: A Report to the Minister of 
Justice (1987) 8 (Vernon Report). For a commentary on the Vernon Report see D Harland, ‘Post-Sale 
Consumer Legislation for New Zealand – A discussion of the Report to the Minister of Justice by Professor 
David H. Vernon’ (1988) 3 Canterbury Law Journal 410. 
30  Vernon, above n 29, 17. 
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CCAAC recommended that the terminology in the new statutory consumer guarantees needs 
to be simplified and that a guarantee of durability should form part of the guarantee of 
acceptable quality. 
 
Finding 5.3 by CCAAC recommended that the Australian Consumer Law should include a 
single set of consistent statutory consumer guarantees that are simple and clear and that at a 
minimum should include: 
 
In respect of goods: 
 
• a guarantee that the supplier has the right to sell the goods; 
• a guarantee that the goods are free from any undisclosed security; 
• a guarantee that the consumer will have undisturbed possession of the goods; 
• a guarantee that goods are of ‘acceptable quality’ which would replace the concept of 
‘merchantable quality’, and which includes a detailed definition of ‘acceptable quality,’ 
so that goods are: 
: fit for the purposes for which the goods are commonly supplied; 
: acceptable in appearance;  
: free from both major and minor defects; 
: safe; and 
: durable; and  
as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods, 
including hidden defects, would regard as acceptable, having regard to: 
: the nature of the goods; 
: the price (where relevant); 
: any statements made about the goods on any packaging or label on the goods; 
: any representation made about the goods by the supplier or manufacturer/ importer; and 
: all other relevant circumstances of the supply of the goods; 
• a guarantee that the goods are fit for a particular purpose made know to the supplier by 
the consumer; 
• where goods are sold by description, a guarantee that goods will comply with that 
description; 
• where goods are sold by sample, a guarantee that the goods comply with that sample; 
• where goods are first supplied to a consumer in Australia, a guarantee that the 
manufacturer/ importer will take reasonable action to ensure that facilities for repair of 
goods and supply of parts for goods are reasonably available for a reasonable period after 
goods were supplied; 
These guarantees should be enforceable against both the manufacturer/importer and the retailer 
of any goods supplied. 
 
In respect of services: 
 
• a guarantee that they will be carried out with reasonable care and skill; 
• a guarantee that, where the actual purpose of the services and any associated goods is 
made clear to the seller, the goods and services are fit for the particular purpose; and 
• a guarantee that the services will be completed in a reasonable time, unless otherwise 
addressed by the contract for the supply of those services.’ 31 
 
These guarantees mirror those contained in ss 5-12 of the CGA in relation to goods, and ss 
28-30 of the CGA in relation to services. 
 
                                                            
31  CCAAC, Consumer Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties, 51-2. 
Vol 9 No 2 (QUTLJJ) Consumer Guarantees in Australia: 
Putting an End to the Blame Game 
  145
The definition of ‘acceptable quality’ provides greater certainty than the term ‘merchantable 
quality’ currently used in the implied terms regime in pt V div 2, and the statutory causes of 
action regime in pt V div 2A of the TPA.  
 
For example, the circumstances in which the standard of ‘merchantable quality’ may be 
satisfied where goods are subject to a defect caused otherwise than through the fault or 
negligence of the supplier is an uncertain and undecided area of the law. The definition of 
‘merchantable quality’ in s 66(2) of the TPA require the court to consider ‘all other relevant 
circumstances’. 
 
The issue was raised in Electricity Supply Association Ltd v ACCC32 where the parties 
expressed different views as to electricity suppliers would be liable for damages for breach of 
implied terms under the TPA as a result of ‘brown outs’ and ‘power surges’ the result of 
force majeure such as lightning strikes, or actions such possums or birds contacting overhead 
wires. Finn J did not have to decide the question but the views of a number eminent counsel 
are canvassed in the reasons for judgment.33 
 
What will be the position if electricity and gas are subject to the new consumer guarantees 
regime of the Australian consumer law? 
 
If Australia adopts the New Zealand CGA consumer guarantees, electricity being goods for 
the purposes of the TPA, the generator and retailer will be strictly liable for supplying 
electricity of an acceptable quality based on an objective test of what a reasonable consumer 
who is fully acquainted with the nature of the product would regard as acceptable. The issue 
is explored further below in connection with Contact Energy Ltd v Jones.34 
 
In relation to the supply of electricity distribution services, the electricity distributor will be 
subject to a fault-based test. The consumer will need to demonstrate a lack of reasonable care 
and skill on the part of the distributor in supplying the services.  
 
CCAAC considered that the statutory consumer guarantees ‘should apply to all products and 
services supplied to domestic consumers, including electricity, gas and 
telecommunications’.35 
 
The word ‘goods’ is currently defined in s 4 of the TPA to include ‘gas and electricity’.  
 
V STATUTORY REMEDIES WILL REPLACE COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
 
CCAAC recommended that:  
 
Clear remedies for each statutory consumer guarantee, including a right to recover loss or 
damage suffered as a result of failure to comply with a guarantee, which distinguishes between: 
 
• remedies for major and minor defects; and 
• remedies against suppliers and manufacturers/ importers.36 
                                                            
32  (2001) 113 FCR 230 (Finn J). 
33  Ibid 239-44.  
34  [2009] 2 NZLR 830. 
35  CCAAC, Consumer Rights: Reforming Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties, 122. 
36  Ibid 52. 
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The CGA (NZ) provides for a hierarchy of remedies against suppliers including repair, 
replacement or refund depending on the nature of the defect. Section 18(2) provides that if 
the failure is minor and is capable of repair, the retailer is given the opportunity to remedy the 
failure within a reasonable time. Section 18(3) provides that if the failure cannot be remedied 
or is of a substantial character, the consumer may reject the goods or obtain from the supplier 
damages in compensation. A substantial failure is where the cost of repair is high compared 
to the overall price of the goods. A number of small faults, each of which is only minor, may 
together constitute a substantial failure. 
 
A statutory remedy for consequential loss replaces the common law test. Section 18(4) of the 
CGA (NZ) provides that in addition to the remedies of repair, replacement or refund ‘the 
consumer may obtain from the supplier damages for any loss or damage to the consumer 
resulting for the failure ... which was reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the 
failure’. 
 
CCAAC made a recommendation that ‘consumers may recover damages for any reasonably 
foreseeable loss or damage resulting from the failure’.37 
 
VI RESPONSIBILITY AS BETWEEN RETAILERS AND MANUFACTURERS 
 
CCAAC recommended that the consumer should be able to proceed against either the retailer 
or the manufacturer for the full amount of the damage at the consumer’s option. In effect the 
retailer and manufacturer will be jointly and severally liable to the consumer. Presumably, 
either the manufacturer or retailer will be able to seek contribution from the other. The 
existing proportionate liability provisions in Pt VIA only apply to causes of action under s 82 
or 87 for contraventions of s 52, and will not apply to consumer guarantees unless they are 
amended. 
 
However, CAAC recognised that in some circumstances it would be unreasonable to make 
the manufacturer jointly liable with the retailer.38  
 
Section 26 of the CGA (NZ) provides that there shall be no right of redress against the 
manufacturer in respect of goods which do not comply with the guarantee of acceptable 
quality only because of: 
 
• An act or default or omission of, or any representation made by, any person other than the 
manufacturer; or 
• A cause independent of human control, occurring after the goods have left the control of 
the manufacturer; or 
• The price charged by the retailer being higher than the manufacturer’s recommended 
retail price or the average retail price. 
 
In relation to the third situation, price will often be a relevant factor in determining the level 
of quality that the consumer is entitled to expect, so that in determining the manufacturer’s 
liability, it is the price recommended by the manufacturer that is relevant. 
 
                                                            
37  Ibid 48. 
38  Ibid. 
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It might be thought to be unreasonable to make the retailer jointly responsible with the 
manufacturer, where the loss suffered is due to a manufacturing fault for which the retailer is 
not responsible.39 However, in such circumstances, where the consumer elects to seek redress 
from the retailer, the retailer may pursue its cause of action against the manufacturer for 
supplying goods that are not of merchantable quality under the relevant Sale of Goods Act. 
 
VII CASE STUDY: DEFECTS IN THE QUALITY OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLIED 
 
The recent decision of Millar J in Contact Energy Ltd v Jones40 provides a good example of 
how the new consumer guarantees regime might work in Australia. 
 
In New Zealand, the Electricity and Gas complaints scheme was established to facilitate the 
resolution of consumer complaints about electricity and gas supply by the Electricity and Gas 
Complaints Commissioner (EGCC). If disputes cannot be resolved, the EGCC has the power 
to make recommendations that are binding.  
 
Five complaints were made against five electricity generators and retailers for damage to 
electrical appliances and property such as furnishings caused by fluctuations in power supply 
as a result of incidents occurring in the distribution process.  
 
Two examples will suffice. First, the Taylor complaint involved one of a series of unplanned 
outages which lasted around nine hours in an urban area. The electricity supplier was Genesis 
energy. The Genesis standard terms expressly provided that Genesis would not be responsible 
if voltage fluctuations damaged sensitive equipment. The Taylors had not installed surge 
protection equipment. 
 
The outage was the result of overhead lines clashing. The lines company, United Networks 
Ltd, had been trimming trees as part of its regular maintenance program, but this left the trees 
more exposed to wind. As a result of the unplanned outage the freezer compartment of the 
refrigerator defrosted and leaked water over the floor, damaging a mat. 
 
The EGCC concluded that the outage was not caused by force majeure or third party action, 
and proposed Genesis Energy pay $200 compensation for the outages and $976.88 for 
damage to the mat. 
 
Secondly, the Latten complaint involved a power outage in a rural area. The electricity 
supplier was Empower. The most likely cause of the outage was a faulty insulator within the 
distribution network. The lines company, Orion, could not have foreseen the fault and had 
adequately maintained the lines and insulators. It was not in breach of its duty of care. As a 
result of the outage the Lattens suffered damage to household appliances, including a 
computer, amounting to $1 462.60.  
 
Empower’s terms and conditions warned that supply might be interrupted by events beyond 
its control and urged its customers to install surge protection devices to protect sensitive 
equipment. It specified that it would not pay compensation for loss or damage to a computer, 
                                                            
39  See s 74H of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) which currently provides that a retailer who has been sued 
for breach of an implied term under pt V div 2 of the TPA had a right to claim compensation from the 
manufacturer. 
40  [2009] 2 NZLR 830. 
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and would not be liable for incidents beyond its reasonable control. The Lattens had not 
installed surge protection devices.  
 
The EGCC concluded that while a reasonable consumer in a rural area would expect a lower 
standard of supply than in an urban area because the line supplying the property was longer, 
insulator failure was not a force majeure incident and Empower was liable under the 
guarantee of acceptable quality. 
 
The five electricity retailers brought proceedings in the Wellington High Court seeking 
declarations as to the proper interpretation of the CGA (NZ). 
 
VIII RETAILER’S GUARANTEE OF ACCEPTABLE QUALITY 
 
The first issue was whether the retailer’s guarantee of acceptable quality excluded liability for 
losses caused by distribution faults. 
 
The retailers submitted that the CGA (NZ) contemplates that retailers will not be liable at all 
for faulty line function services. Providers of line function services are under fault-based 
liability, whereas retailers of electricity (goods) are under strict liability. The retailers argued 
that imposing strict liability on retailers for line faults cannot have been Parliament’s 
intention, as retailers cannot manage the risk. Accordingly, for loss resulting from the 
provision of line function services, the retailers argued that the lines company was the 
relevant supplier. If the loss did not result from the provision of line function services, then 
the question was whether the supply of electricity met the acceptable quality guarantee. 
 
Miller J did not accept this construction of the definition of ‘supplier’. The terms ‘electricity’ 
and ‘electricity line function services’ are not defined in the CGA (NZ) which suggests that 
the Parliament did not intend to clearly demarcate between them. Rather, the clear policy of 
the CGA (NZ)was to allow the consumer to claim against either firm. 
 
In support of this construction, Miller J referred to the Vernon Report: 
 
The report ... concluded ... that as a matter of policy the retailer ought to be liable to the 
consumer for badly made goods, leaving the retailer to claim reimbursement from others in the 
supply chain, even where the retailer is ignorant of the defects. And in the context of electricity, 
the legislative history suggests strongly that Parliament wanted to ensure consumers do not 
labour under the onus of proving which firm – retailer or lines company – is responsible for a 
defect in the quality of electricity supplied; rather, the two firms should be encouraged to 
resolve liability between them, with the consumer free to claim against either.41 
 
Miller J held that ‘by insisting that electricity be defined as a good, the legislature opted for 
strict liability for retailers’.42 His Honour held that retailers can be liable to consumers for the 
supply of electricity that is below acceptable quality even though the faults occur in the 
distribution network.  
 
As regards the expectations of the hypothetical reasonable consumer Miller J made a number 
of findings. First, his Honour noted that ‘the test is objective, but it is applied to the particular 
                                                            
41  Ibid [73]. 
42  Ibid [101]. 
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goods and circumstances’.43 The question whether a given supply of electricity breached the 
acceptable quality guarantee is ‘a question of fact and degree’.44  
 
His Honour identified the following, non-exhaustive list of things that the reasonable 
consumer must be taken to consider: 
 
• The uses to which electricity is commonly put, including personal computers and other 
electronic consumer equipment.45 
• The nature and extent of the risk posed by the fault, and the extent to which safety may be 
compromised.46 
• The extent, duration, and frequency of the faults: one or more outages or voltage 
fluctuations may be acceptable, but not a series of outages including a nine hour outage as 
in the Taylor complaint.47 
• The point at which an outage or voltage fluctuation becomes unacceptable needs to have 
regard to the nature of the distribution system to which the consumer is connected (urban 
or rural environmental risks; overhead or underground lines) and any quality standards set 
by the regulator.48 
• The cause of the fault is relevant but not determinative: the reasonable consumer does not 
expect the retailer or lines company to manage force majeure events, including acts of 
God or other extraordinary circumstance that could not have been foreseen and guarded 
against, and third party damage; however, a reasonable consumer would expect them to 
protect against some third party damage where assets are exposed and or the consequence 
of failure very severe.49 
• The price of the service: if the cost of eliminating some interruptions completely is so 
high that consumers would not be prepared to pay the consumer must be taken to have 
accepted an outage or surge resulting from that cause.50 
• Information provided by the supplier as to the quality of the goods: information that surge 
protection equipment may protect against risks that the retailer cannot control may mean 
that the guarantee was not breached.51 
 
Millar J concluded that taking all these factors into account could result in a retailer being 
liable for distribution faults even though the lines company was not at fault, as was the case 
with the Lattens’ complaint. 
 
IX DEFECTS SPECIFICALLY DRAWN TO THE CONSUMER’S ATTENTION 
 
The second issue was whether the retailers were excused from complying with the guarantee 
of acceptable quality because they had expressly drawn the consumer’s attention to the risks 
of outages and fluctuations in their standard terms and conditions of supply. 
 
 
                                                            
43  Ibid [94]. 
44  Ibid [102]. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid [103]. 
47  Ibid [104]. 
48  Ibid [105]. 
49  Ibid [106]. 
50  Ibid [107]. 
51  Ibid [108]. 
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Section 7(2) of the CGA (NZ) provides: 
 
Where any defects in goods have been specifically drawn to the consumer’s attention before he 
or she agreed to the supply, then notwithstanding that a reasonable consumer may not have 
regarded the goods as acceptable with those defect the goods will not fail to comply with the 
guarantee as to acceptable quality by reason only of those defects. 
 
Miller J did not accept that s 7(2) excused the retailers, ‘merely because the consumer’s 
attention has been drawn in very general terms to the risk of faults, the possibility of damage, 
and the availability of surge protection equipment’.52 
 
Section 7(2) required that the consumer be given sufficient information of any failure of the 
goods to comply with the guarantee so that the consumer can make an informed decision 
whether to take the goods and evaluate what precaution may be taken to avoid the risk of 
damage.53  
 
Miller J noted that the underlying premise of s 7(2) was that if a consumer is told in advance 
of the specific fault, the consumer can choose another good without the fault at a higher price. 
However, in the context of electricity this was not an option because all of the competing 
electricity generators were forced to use the same lines distributor.54 
 
X LOSS SHARING BETWEEN THE RETAILER AND THE CONSUMER 
 
The third issue was whether the failure by the complainants to install surge protection 
equipment affected causation and damages. 
 
Counsel for the retailers submitted that because a reasonable consumer would know that 
voltage fluctuations are inevitable and that surge protection devices can protect sensitive 
equipment, the loss should be apportioned between the retailer and the consumer where the 
loss results from both breach of the guarantee and the failure to employ appropriate surge 
equipment. 
 
Section 18(4) of the CGA (NZ) provides that in addition to the remedies of repair, 
replacement or refund ‘the consumer may obtain from the supplier damages for any loss or 
damage to the consumer resulting from the failure ... which was reasonably foreseeable as 
liable to result from the failure’.  
 
Miller J held that the language indicated that the Court’s power to award the full loss was 
discretionary, and carried with it the power to award less, taking into account the consumer’s 
contribution to the loss.55 His Honour held that the language of s 18(4) ‘evokes the common 
law, with its commonsense approach to causation and remoteness’.56  
 
                                                            
52  Ibid [116]. 
53  Ibid [114]. 
54  Ibid [113]. 
55  Ibid [131] by analogy with the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Goldsbro v Walker [1993] 1 NZLR 394 where in 
relation to the Fair Trading Act 1986 (NZ) Hardy Boys J held (at 406) that the power to order payment of 
the entire loss encompasses a discretion to award less taking into account the plaintiff’s contribution to the 
loss. 
56  Contact Energy Ltd v Jones [2009] 2 NZLR 830, [133]. 
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Miller J accepted that electricity retailing differed from other goods in that the retailer was 
not able to prevent or manage defects and that the consumer may be able to manage defects 
by installing surge devices.57 Nevertheless, the consumer would be entitled to recover the full 
amount of the loss unless the retailer could establish that it was more likely than not that 
surge equipment would have avoided the loss.58 
 
There were insufficient facts regarding each claim to determine whether the retailers were 
liable. Miller J concluded that the EGCC’s approach was mistaken in at least some respects 
and the EGCC was ordered to reconsider the five complaints. 
 
XI CONSUMER GUARANTEES AND THE EXISTING CONSUMER PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF 
THE TPA 
 
Some might argue that there is no need for a consumer guarantees regime and that it will 
result in consumers being faced with a complex smorgasbord of rights that will only confuse 
them. However, each liability regime serves a different purpose and all are necessary to 
provide the consumer with complete protection. This part will examine the different types of 
protection afforded by the existing laws and the proposed new laws so that the full picture 
under the Australian Consumer Law emerges. 
 
First, in relation to the current law, the prohibitions in pt V div 1 against misleading conduct 
in relation to the supply of goods or services will be retained.59 For example, if an electricity 
retailer advertises that it will supply a prospective customer with electricity at a discount of 
2% below the regulated rate, and the contract eventually signed by the consumer specifies 
that supply is at the regulated rate, the retailer will be in breach of ss 52 and 53(e) of the TPA. 
 
The prohibitions against unconscionable conduct in pt IVA will also be retained.60 For 
example, if a retailer sends a door-to-door salesperson to the home of an elderly pensioner 
and it is apparent to the salesperson that the pensioner, as a result of age or infirmity, is 
unable to comprehend the terms of the supply contract being offered, the pensioner may be 
able to have the supply contract set aside on the ground that the conduct of the salesperson 
was unconscionable under s 51AB of the TPA. 
 
Part VA which creates statutory causes of action where goods are defective, as opposed to 
being merely faulty, will also be retained. 
 
The existing statutory implied terms regime in pt V div 2 of the TPA, equivalent generic 
regimes in the legislation of the States and Territories, and the statutory causes of action in pt 
V div 2A of the TPA will be repealed. Presumably, the State and Territory Sale of Goods 
Acts will be amended so that they only apply to non-consumer transactions. 
 
In relation to the proposed new laws, Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer 
Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) was introduced into the House of Representatives on 24 June 2009. The 
Bill applies where the contract is a standard form contract,61 and the contract is for the supply 
                                                            
57  Ibid [136]. 
58  Ibid [137]. 
59  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 53, 55A. 
60  Trade Practice Act 1974 (Cth) s 51AB prohibits unconscionable conduct in relation to consumer 
transactions. 
61  Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) cl 2(1)(b). 
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of goods or services to an individual whose acquisition is ‘wholly or predominantly’ for 
personal, domestic or household use or consumption.62  
 
A term in a standard form contract will be unfair if:  
 
(a) it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the 
contract; and 
(b) it is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party to be 
advantaged by the term.63  
 
Examples of terms that might satisfy this definition in the context of electricity supply 
include:  
 
• a term that permits the electricity supplier to terminate the supply of electricity at any 
time and for any reason; 
• where the agreement is terminated before the expiry of a fixed term, a provision that 
imposes an early termination fee on the consumer that exceeds the supplier’ reasonable 
administration charges associated with the disconnection; and  
• a term that purports to exclude all liability for any loss or damage arising from 
fluctuations or outages howsoever arising. 
 
The other proposed new law to be included in the Australian Consumer Law is the consumer 
guarantees regime. As explained above, it applies where faulty goods or services are supplied 
independently of any misleading or unconscionable conduct that preceding the formation of 
the contract, and independently of any unfair terms in the contract itself. 
 
XII CONSUMER GUARANTEES AND THE NATIONAL ENERGY CUSTOMER FRAMEWORK 
 
The Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) has established a Retail Policy Work Group 
(RPWG) to develop a new national regime regulating the retail distribution of energy (gas 
and electricity). 
 
A second exposure draft of the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF2) was released 
on 2 November 2009.64 It is envisaged that the operation of the NECF and the Australian 
Consumer Law will be consistent and complementary. The term ‘consumer’ under the 
Australian Consumer Law is not used in the NECF2. The equivalent term is ‘residential 
customer’ which is defined to mean ‘a customer who purchases energy principally for 
personal, household or domestic use at premises’. 
 
The marketing rules under the NECF will align with the Australian Consumer Law. Part 7 of 
the NECF will establish a Small Compensation Claims Regime. Small claims are currently 
the subject of a range of different arrangements. Section 710 provides: 
 
(1)  Compensation is payable under this Division to a small customer by a distributor under a 
claim for compensation properly made in respect of a claimable incident when— 
(a)  it is established that— 
                                                            
62  Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) cl 2(3). 
63  Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill 2009 (Cth) cl 3(1). 
64   Available at:< http://www.ret.gov.au/Documents/mce/_documents/NECF%20Package%20-
%20Second%20Exposure%20Draft.pdf >at 28 February 2010. 
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(i)  the distributor provided customer connection services to the premises of the small 
customer at the relevant time; and 
(ii)  the claimable incident occurred; and 
(iii)  the claim is for a compensable matter arising from or connected with the claimable 
incident; and 
(iv)  the amount claimed and the amount payable are within the range between the minimum 
amount and the maximum amount (inclusive of both amounts); and 
(b)  any applicable requirements of this Division and the Rules are satisfied. 
(2)  Compensation is monetary in nature. 
 
An example of a ‘claimable incident’ would be a voltage variation. It is envisaged that the 
type of damage that may be compensated is minor property damage of the type suffered by 
the Taylors and the Lattens in Contact Energy Ltd v Jones considered above.  
 
Upper limits as to the damage that may be claimed are to be set by regulation. If the elements 
of a claim based on s 710 are established the liability of a distributor is strict, in the sense that 
it arises independently of fault on the part of the distributor. 
 
Section 711 provides: 
 
(1)  Each distributor must develop and publish on its website— 
(a)  a summary of the small compensation claims regime in a form that will be readily 
understood by the average small customer; and 
(b)  a copy of a claim form that is able to be downloaded. 
 
(2)  A distributor must, within 2 business days of a person making contact with the distributor 
in relation to a potential claimable incident— 
(a)  inform the person that a small customer affected by the incident may be entitled to 
compensation; and 
(b)  advise the person that the distributor’s summary of the small compensation claims 
regime, and a copy of a claim form, is available on its website; and 
(c)  send to the person a copy of its claim form on request and at no charge. 
 
It is unclear how the Small Claims Compensation Regime of the NECF will sit with the 
consumer guarantees part of the Australian Consumer Law. It appears that while the 
marketing rules for electricity will align with the Australian Consumer Law, the Government 
proposes to establish a separate compensation regime for damages suffered by residential 
customers from fluctuations in electricity supply. 
 
The fundamental policy objective of the PC in its review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework was to establish one generic consumer protection regime that applies across all 
sectors of the economy and jurisdictions. It appears that even before the new consumer 
guarantees Bill has been introduced into Parliament, a sector specific regime is being 
contemplated.  
 
XIII CONCLUSION 
 
The NEIAT study produced some surprising data about the statutory implied terms scheme. 
There is a widespread lack of awareness on the part of consumers, retailers and 
manufacturers that consumers are entitled to remedies for faulty goods and service. The scope 
of protection offered by the implied terms is unclear. The cost of litigating to enforce the 
statutory implied terms is prohibitive. The result is that retailers and manufacturers have no 
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incentive to comply with the current law and frequently play the ‘blame game’ with neither 
party prepared to take responsibility. 
 
The CGA (NZ) has been described as a loss allocation mechanism.65 Its policy is to avoid the 
‘blame game’ by adopting a ‘single enterprise theory’ which allows the consumer to recover 
from the retailer without proof of fault, leaving the retailer to pursue any remedies of its own 
against the manufacturer or others. The adoption of the CGA (NZ) in Australia will provide 
greater clarity and certainty. If the law is known and understood by those it is intended to 
protect, it should lead to retailers and consumers settling disputes expeditiously. In the case of 
recalcitrant retailers, the ACCC should have the power to take action on behalf of consumers 
in respect of their statutory guarantee rights where such action would encourage compliance 
with the law. 
 
On 15 August 2008, MCCA agreed to the following national consumer policy objective: ‘To 
improve consumer well being through consumer empowerment and protection fostering 
effective competition and enabling confident participation of consumers in markets in which 
both consumers and suppliers trade fairly.’ 
 
The proposed consumer guarantees regime will go some way to achieving that objective. It is 
intended to prevent unfairness by ensuring that consumers’ reasonable expectations are met; 
to ensure that consumers get what they pay for; and to put an end to the blame game. The 
consumer guarantees regime appears to have worked well in New Zealand. Whether it thrives 
in Australian soil remains to be seen. Much work remains to be done, especially with regard 
to putting in place effective dispute resolution mechanisms for consumers. 
                                                            
65  Acquired Holdings Ltd v Turvey (2008) NZBLC 102, 107. 
